The Privacy Paradox Is a Misnomer: Data Under Structural Uncertainty

Cite as: 10 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 1 (2026)

The infamous privacy paradox refers to the apparent inconsistency between people’s stated concern for privacy and their readiness to disclose personal information. This phenomenon has sparked two largely disconnected literatures: one offering experimental evidence of inconsistent behavior, and another providing qualitative accounts and defending the importance of privacy. The Article presents an online field experiment that bridges those literatures and shows that the so-called paradox arises from a mischaracterization of the underlying behavior. The Article finds that it is structural uncertainty about risk that drives seemingly paradoxical privacy decisions. It does so by isolating discounting mechanisms and empirically testing whether observed privacy choices reflect temptation or rational responses to uncertainty. The results suggest that privacy behavior is not paradoxical but, rather, consistent with choices shaped by incomplete information. The Article then discusses the policy implications of this reframing. As privacy decisions stem from structural uncertainty, which operates as a market failure, regulation should aim to reduce that uncertainty. This supports regulation that prioritizes transparency—for people to assess the risks of data collection—and flexibility mechanisms that accommodate evolving contexts. Such reframing provides a new argument for the right to be forgotten, which allows people to revisit prior disclosures as new risks become apparent. By shifting the focus from individual inconsistency to structural uncertainty, the findings call for privacy law to better reflect the reality of people’s decision-making environments.

Ignacio Cofone

Professor of Law & Regulation of AI, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law & Institute for Ethics in AI; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Information Society Project. Many thanks to Alessandro Acquisti, Ian Ayres, Jane Bambauer, Jack Balkin, Andrew Hayashi, Al Klevorick, Florencia Marotta- Wurgler, Cherie Metcalf, Alan Miller, Adriana Robertson, Ira Rubenstein, Robert Spear, Katherine Strandburg, and Tom Tyler for their helpful comments on prior versions of this Article. I’m also grateful to participants of the Canadian Law & Economics Association Conference, two anonymous reviewers contacted by the GLTR, and the editors of the GLTR for their helpful feedback; and I’m grateful to Aya Amer for her extraordinary research assistance. The Article was possible thanks to funding from the Yale Law School Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Development Grant.